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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL I!.AW

Fraudulent Evidmu Bifore Public fntenuztional
Tribunals: The Dirt] Stories of /memational
Law. By W. Michael Reisman and Christina
Skinner. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge
Universicy Press, 20 I 4. Pp. x, 222. Index. $90.
Incernational law scholarship frequently centers on big-picrure theoretical and conceprual
questions. Scholarly debates asking "Is imernationallaw law?" were all the rage some decades
ago, 1 while now much ink is spilJed on the fragmentation (or pluralism) ofincernauonallaw,2 the
rise of rhe individual in inremarional law;' and
renewed debates pitting realism aga.insr idealism, 4
1
LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW
AND FOREIGN POLICY 88-98 (2d ed. 1979); HANS
KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL REIJ\TIONS 1, 52, 54-55 (1942); GEORGE F. KENNAN,
AMERICAN 011'L0MACY 1900-1950, at 95-103 (rev.
cd. 1984); Anthony D'Amato, Is International LAw
ReaDy ·LAw'?, 79 Nw. U. L REv. 1293 (1985).
2
Gerhasd Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuingftom Fragmemation of /numational Lnw, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L.
849, 856-58 (2004); Mami Koskenniemi & Paivi
Leino, Fragmmtation oflnumarional LAw! Posrmodem
Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 553 (2002). In recent
years, scholarly debates about pluralism have extended
ro rhe sublield of inrernarional criminal law. Su, e.g.,
Elies van Sliedregt & Sergey Vasiliev, Pluralism: A New

Fram~ork

for /numational Crimi11al justice, in

PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3,
10-11 (Elies van Sliedregr & Sergey Vasiliev eds.,
20 14); Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, The Pluralism of
lnrmzational Criminal Law, 861ND. LJ. 1063, 1069
(2011).
J KATE PARLETIE, THE INDIVliDUAL IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGALSYSTE..\4: CONTINUtn' AND
CHANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (201 I); Andrew
Clapham, The Role of the Individual in lmemntionaL
LAw, 2 1 EUR. ). INT'L L. 2S (20 10).
4
Su, e.g., }ENS DAVID OHLIN, THE ASSAULT ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW (20 15); ERIC A. POSNER &
ADRlAN VERMEULE, THE ExECUTIVE UNBOUND:

697

among other lofty topics. Although these and
other clteoreticaJ dialogues have been insrrumemal
in advancing international law conceptually as
weU as pracdcaJJy, they can inadvertendy crowd
our more commonplace issues that can have an
equal or greater iimpacron internationallawand its
development. One of these more mundane, yet
vitally important, concerns is the subject of a new
book, Fraudulmt Evitknce Befort Public International Tribunals: The Dirt] Stories ofInternational
Law, written by W. Michael Reisman, che Myres
S. McDougal Professor ofl nrernational Law at che
Yale Law School, and Christina Skinner, an Associate in Law at Columbia Law School.
Frauduknt Evidtnct Befort Public international
Tribunals, as its name suggesrs, details a series of
cases in which litigants presented false, forged, or
otherwise misrepresentative evidence ro international courts and tribunals. Each chapter presents
acasesrudy (seven in aU), with the lirsrdatingfrom
World War I and the last concluding in 2001.
Whereas some of the case studies had already been
well treated in the scholarly literarure,5 orherswere
virruaiJy unknown before the publication of chis
book.6 Moreover, even those cases that had
AITER THE MADISON IAN REPUBLIC (20l0); ERICA.
POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM (2009);
ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR lN
THE BAlANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE
COURTS (200n; jACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A.
POSNER, THE LiMITS OF INTERNATIONAL lAW
(2005); jOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND
PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AITER 9111 (2005).
5 For instance, the Sabotage cases, which ase detailed
in chapter 2, formed the subject of a number of law
review articles an.d book sections. Su, e.g., Timothy G.
Nelson, The Explosion and the Tmimony: The WWJ Sab-

otage Claims and an lnttrnazional Arbitral Tribunal's
Power to Revise Its Own Awards, 23 AM. REv. INT'L
ARB. 197 (20 12); L. H. Woolsey, TheArbitrationofthe
Sabotage Claims Against Germany, 33 AJIL 737 (I 939);
HENRY LANDAU, THE ENEMY WITHIN: THE INSIDE
STORY OF GERMAN SABOTAGE IN AMERICA (193n;
3 J. Grws WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 302-06
(1979). Shabtai Rosenne deemed the Sabotagt cases a
"weU-known instance of collusive or fraudulent evidence before an international tribunal." ROSENNE'S
THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT
WORKS 253 n.23 (Terry D. Gill c:d.,6th rev. ed. 2003).
6
I have seen very little scholarly discussion ofthe misrepresentations :at issue in the boundary dispute
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received a reasonable amount of scholarly am~n
tion are discussed far more expansively in this
book. For example, although several law review
arricles and books summarily describe the forged
documents that Qatar submiued to the International Courr of Justice (ICJ) during its boundary
dispute wirh Bahrain,7 Fraudltklll Evidence Before
Public lntunational Tribunals examines the forgeries in scrupulous---and interesting-derail.8
Indeed, rhe aurhors' careful and comprehensive
detailing of the various cases probably stands as the
book's most notable fearure. And beyond such
detailing, rhe aurhors also include a substantial
quantity of background and contextual material
that makes rhe book both informative and accessible. Some of the imernational disputes in question occurred many decades ago, so readers may
not be entirely familiar wirh them. The background materials that the amhors include, however, help to situate each conAict in its rc:levant
geopolitical and legal comext. That said, at times
rhe book's descriptions are so richly detailed chat
readers must take care not to lose the forest for the
trees. But overall rhe book's most significant conrribution likely lies in irs careful documentation of
a series of otherwise unrelated cases in which rhe
presentation of fraudulent evidence not only
impaired rhe relevant international court's ability
berwcen Libya and Tunisia before the International
Court of] ustice that forms the subject ofchapter 4. The
following sources contain brief mentions of the C3Se:
Robin GeiB, R(llision Promdings &fort.!llf lnr"!'ational Coun ofjusticc, 63 ZEJTSCHR!Fi FUR AysLANOISCHES 0FFEN11JCHES RECHT UNO VOLKERRECHT 167-68, 175, 179, 184-85, 187, 189 (2003);
Jean-Pierre Cot, FraudontiJe Tribmml?,in l.AWOFTHE
SEA FROM GROTIUS TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL OF THE L\W OF THE SEA 597, 599 (Uiian del
CastiUo ed., 2015).
7 KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLmCS, RIGHTS
172-76 (20 14); ARMAN SARVAR.IAN, PROFESSIONAL.
ETHICS AT THE INTERNATIONAL BAR 104-05
(20 13); Geoffrey MarSton, Falsifiration ofD()('lmzmtary
Evidmu &fore lnumntio1111l Tribun11ls: An Asp<ct oftlx
&hring St4 Arbitration, 1892-3, 2000 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L 357, 357-58.
8 The only work that I could find that providesasim·
ilarly detailed look at Qatar's forged documems is
]A WAD SALIM AL-ARAYEO, A LTNE IN THE SEA: TH£
QATAR V. BAHRAIN BORDER DISPIJTE IN THE
WORLD COURT 355-92 (2003).

(Vol. 109

to find accurate F.tcrs but also forced the coun ro
grapple with a host ofdifficult questions. The discovery of fraudulent evidence in some cases, for
instance, required courtS to balance carefully rhe
interests of finality against rhe interests of aocuracy.9 Allegations of fraudulent evidence in or her
cases led couru ro employ evidentiary devices such
as presumptions, burden shifts, and adverse inferences, which can serve to deter or encourage the
presentation of fraudulent evidence depending on
how chey arc used (pp. 104- 17). Finally, cases in
which government lawyers were asked co submit
questionable evidence or advance misrepresernta·
tive argumcn rs for the good of rhe nation showcased rhe dash between sovereignty and profes·
sional ethics that can occur in international
litigation. 10
The autho·rs advance certain conclusions about
these issues as they rc:lare to rhe case srudies in
question. For instance, they criticize the lr:an·
United States Claims Tribunal for irs "marked disinclination" 1(0 publicly call our fraudulent evidence for wlm ir is (p. 125). In addition, they
critically observe that the Tribunal's use of inferences, presumptions, and evidentiary burdens,
though reasonable on irs fuce,led the Tribunal to
impose "no sanctions for the use offraudulent evidence" (pp. 125-26). The authors also put fonh
some preliminary views on the questions of professional responsibility raised by fraudulent evidence.
They argue, in part, chat, in an international case,
9 The ease :studies suggest that different tribunals
ascribe vastly different weights tO finality. The U.S.·
Mexican Claims Commission of the mid-nineteenth
century, for instance, "show(ed) great reverence for
finaliryofinternationaJ awards" (p. I O).lt consequently
rejected Mexico's request for a rehearing based on
new evidence because it assumed "that the adminis·
tradve consequences of allowing the reopening of
awards would undermine rhe enrire decisional process" (pp. I 0 - II ). By contrast, the German-U.S.
Mixed Claims Commission did nor hesitate to
reopen the Sabotage cases based on American allegations of fraud (pp. 32-33). Some years later, another
arbitral tribunal-the Iran-United States Claims Tri·
bunal-cxhibited a reluctance to reopen cases on the
basis offraud rhat was reminiscent of the U.S.-Mexican Claims Commission (pp. 117-23).
10 The authors' description of the Corfo C!Jamul
C3SC, Corfu Channel (UK v. Alb.), 1949 ICJ REP. 4
(Apr. 9). highlights these tensions (pp. 54-77).
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the burden ofcontaining fraud should be borne by
the counsel proffering the questionable evidence
(p. 190). The authors recognize that placing the
burden on the proffering counsel could give rise w
significant practical difficulties, especially if it
requires a lawyer to use experts to investigate his
own client and the documents that the diem
provides (id. ). They nonetheless conclude tbar
because proffering counsel possess such superior
informacion abour the evidence that they submit,
they should bear the burden of satisfying themselves of the evidence's authenticity (id. ). The
book ends with a seven-page conclusion in which
the authors delineate the various difficulties thar
render "practicable solutions to the problem of
fraudulent evidence before public international
tribunals ... elusive" (p. 193).
Although the authors reached well-supported
and interesting conclusions, through much of the
book I found myself itching for more. In particular, I wished that the authors would do more synthesizing of the various cases and would present
more comprehensive and integrated normacive
proposals. As noted, the authors do advance some
normative conclusions, but they stop well short of
promoting a particular thesis for how international lawyers should approach questionable evidence and how courtS that receive such evidence
should respond. The authors are undoubtedly correct thar cenain fearures of international law and
international adjudication, not to mention the
impediments posed by global policies, make
addressing fraudulent evidence in the international context more fraught with difficulty than in
the domestic context. Yet, my first reaction was to
think that there must be some rules, policies, or
strategies that international courts can usefully
employ to address the problem of fraudulenr evidence.
By the end of the book, however, r came tO recognize that a desire foranythingresemblinga comprehensive solution is unrealistic. For one thing.
the case srudies in the book feature a wide array
ofproblematic evidence and arguments, including
various forms of fraud, omissions, and misrepresentations. In some cases, the dishonesty is evident
and unquestionable; for example, the book
describes the IC)'s Qatllr v. Bahrain case, which
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fearured eighry-two clearly forged documents. 11 I
term these documents "clearly forged" because
they "were not only mysteriously absent from any
archive besides the Diwan Amiri Archives in
Doha, bur they were also riddled with historical
anachronisms" (p. 180). T he documents included
"letters written ro and from persons dead at the
time of the alleged writing, leners writren to and
from officials whose positions did nor exist, [and]
letters written in Arabic between two English
speakers-to name just a few examples ofthe fraud
uncovered by [Bahrain's] experts" (it/.). Given the
obviousness of the forgeries, it came as no surprise
when Qatarquicklywithdrew the documentsaf,er
Bahrain's experts questioned their authenticiry. 12
In many o( the orher cases showcased in the
book, howeve r, the evidence featured more subtle
and more contested difficulties. In rhe I C)'s C()ntinmtlll Sh~lfcase involving Libya and Tunisia, for
example, Libya submitted documents and made
arguments that strongly implied an erroneous
(and favorable) boundary for Libya's oil concession (pp. 79-80, 89). The documents rhac Libya
submined were accurate as far as they went, bur
they did not delineate the concession's coordinates, and Libya failed to submit related documents that did (pp. 84-85}. Two years after the
ICJ issued its judgment, Tunisia learned of the
concession's ac[Ual coordinates, and it asked
the ICJ to revise irs judgment accordingly." In
addressing T unisia's request, lhe ICJ bypassed any
consideration of the improprieryoflibya's behavior. instead, it concerned itself with Tunisia, finding that revision was nor appropriate under rhe
ICJ Rules of Court because Tunisia had it~elf
failed to ascercain rhe coordinates of the concession, alrhough that information was available to
11

Maricime Delimitation and Territorial Quescions
Berween Qatar and Bahrain (Qacarv. Bahr.), 2001 1C}
REP. 40, paras. 18,20 (Mar. 16) (hereinafter Maritime
Delimitarion).The book also describes plainly forged
documenu submined to the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal, as well as to the U.S.-Mcxican Claims Commission (pp. 9-12, 104-17).
12
Maricime Delimitation, supra noce II, para. 20.
u Applicario n for Revision and I nterpreration of rhe
Judgment of24 February 1982 in the Case Concerning
the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jama·
hiriya) (Tunis. v. Libya), 1985 ICJ REP. 192, para. 6
(Dec. 10).
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it . 14 Whether or nor one agrees with that holding, nal's decision accepting jurisdiction over the
no one would deny that Libya's failure to submit daims of Iranian-American dual narional.s 16 led
relevant evidence (that had not been requested) the Tribunal to suspend operations entirely for a
srands as a lesser form of wrongdoing-if it even few months, 17 .and put the cases of dual nationals
should be considered wrongdoing at all-than on hold for even longer, in order to"give I ran time
Qatar's submission of dozens of dearly forged to overcome irs anger." 18 In shorr, anyone who has
and fabricated documents. Consequently, couns worked at an imernacional court knows that the
muse craft different responses for different types of development of any rule. policy, or practice takes
(mis)behaviors.
place against a background of concern about the
Further, it is not only the fact that questionable state response ro that rule, policy, or practice.
evidence comes in many different sizes and Aavors Whereas domestic lawmakers concerned about
that complicates the desirabiliry-indced, the fraudulent evidence need consider only which
feasibility-of potential remedial options. Vari- policy is mostly like to advance the lawmakers'
ous facts about the imemational courtS also goals, international lawmakers must consider that
become relevant when determining the appropri- dynamic, plus a multitude ofocher factors relating
ate response to fraudulenr evidence. In particular, to the court's power and inAuence in the context
courtS that boast greater longevity, prestige, in which it operates. Pur bluntly, it does not matter
resources, and polirical independence, to name a which course is theoretically best for addressing
few factors, may be bener able to develop rules
designed to punish, and thereby deter, the submis- second I an close thedoorto myofficcbecausewithout them I cannot do anything all.• J. Coli Metcalfe,
sion of fraudulent evidence chan courts that arc Anlnrrrvirw
wi1IJ Unitrd Nntiom' Chir[Wnr Crimrs
temporary, ad hoc, or dependent in some way on Prosmuor, Cnrln Dr/ Ponrr, lNTERNEWS, Feb. 15,
any of the state litigants. or course, this insight 2000, at hrrps://web.archive.org/web/200 1() 124093400/
is hardly limited to the development of rules http://www.inte.rnews.org/aetivities/ICTR_repons/
lCfRDelPonte.htm. Following Del Ponte's plea, the
responding to fraudulent evidence. Everyone Appeals Chamber ~instated Barayagwiz.a's indictment,
understood, for instance, that when the Interna- and relations between the IerR and Rwanda normalized.
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Prosccutorv. Bar.ayagwiza, Case No. ICfR-97-19-AR72.
abruptly reversed irsdfin the Barayagwizn case, it Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Review or Rcamsidcr.uion (Mar. 31. 2000). Foran insider's :ux:ounc of the
did so because Rwanda's extraordinarily negative crisis, sec KINGSLEY MOCHALU, RWANDA'S GENOreacrion to the dismissal ofBarayagwiza's indict- CIDE: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAl. jUSTICE 101-23
ment seriously impaired the ICfR's :tbiliry to (2005).
Rwanda also responded very negatively co Del
function.•s Similarly, Iran's w;ldly negative Ponte's
efforts to investigate members of the current
response to the Iran-United States Claims Tribu- Rwandan government. ~t Syntlmis: Prostroton nt tht
ICTR, ARUSHA TIMES, Oct. 30, 2003, at http://www.
14
arushatimes.co.tz:/2003/43/un_tribunal.htm
(reprint of
/d., pans. 25-28.
Hironddle
News
Agency
story);
MOGHALU,
n1prn, at
1
~ The JCrRAppealsChamber initially dismissed with
140. After Del Pome was replaced as prosecutor by Hassan
prejudice the indictment :lgllinst Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza Jallow, no further investigations were undertaken. VICand ordered him rdeascd after determining tlut the pros- TOR
PESKIN, lm-ERNATIONAL]USTICE IN RWANDA
ecution had violated Barayagwiza's right to be brought ANDTHEBALJ<A.NS:
VIRTUAl. TRIALSANDTHESTRUGprompdy bcfo~ a judge following arrest. Prosecutor v.
GLE FOR STATE. COOPERATION 225 (2008).
B:myagwiza, Case No. JCfR-97-19-AR72, Motion for
16
GEORGE H. ALDRICH, THE jURISPRUDENCE OF
Orders to Review and/or Nullify Arrest and Provisional
THE
IRAN-UNITED STATES C~IMS TRIBUNAL: AN
Detention, para. 119 (Nov. 3, 1999). This decision
ANALYSIS
OF THE DECISIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL )8
outraged Rwanda to such a degree that it suspended
(1996).
all dealings with the lCfR and refused to issue a visa
17 /d. 3[ 26.
to the Tribunal's chief prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte.
18
The prosecution consequently asked the Appeals
Among other things, Iran threatened to boycott
Chamber to reconsider its decision and, in doing so, any session involving the claims ofdual nationals. !d. at
acknowledged Rwanda's power over che Tribunal. In 57-58. What is more, this ruling and certain others so
particular, Del Ponte observed: "If I don't get coop- upset two Iranian arbitrators that they physie<tlly
eration from Rwanda, ... I can first open rhe door at attacked a Swedish arbitratOr, Nils Mangtrd. !d. at
the detention center and set rhem all free and then 24-27.
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fraudulent evidence ar an international court if
rhar best course will be ignored or will impair the
coun's abilicy ro carry our irs mission.
Complicating remedial issues funher are rhe
difficulties of proof rhar arrend allegations of
fraud. Such difficulties are highlighted in the
book's discussion in chapter 5 of the IC)'s Nicaragua v. United States case. 19 A key question there
was whether Nicaragua had been supplying arms
to El Salvadorian insurgents. Although Nicaragua
acknowledged chat some arms might have entered
El Salvador from Nicaragua, ir maintained that
any such shipments were small in number, and it
Aady denied that Nicaragua "had a policy ofsending arms to opposition forces in Central America"
(p. 91). 20 The ICJ accepted Nicaragua's denial, 21
Stephen Schwebel, the U.S. judge ac the ICJ, vigorously dissented, 22 and there the matter reseed
umil 1993, when a cache ofNicaraguan arms held
by Salvadorean rebels was discovered. Many considered this discovery to prove chat Nicaragua had
lied to the court. For instance, Robert Turner
opined that "[w]hacever confusion might have
existed a decade ago on this issue, the facts are now
dear. The Sandinistas deceived most of the judges
on the World Court and a lor of other people as
weU."23 Shabtai Rosenne concurred, concluding
that the discovery of the cache "oonfirmed faces
19
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elucidated by judge Schwebel in his questioning
from the Bench." 24 Indeed, in 2012, Judge
Schwebel himself published a lerrer in the Americanjournal oflnurnational Law in which he maintained that the discovery of the arms cache "should
have been the profound embarrassment of rhe
Coun" because it "proved that the affidavit of the
Nicaraguan foreign minister was false and that
the Sandinisra government of Nicaragua grossly
misled rhe Courr."25 However, even after the discovery, no consensus was reached. Counsel for
Nicaragua, Paul Reichler, rejected Judge Schwebel's conclusions, arguing that "[t]he presence of
arms in Nicaragua in 1993 does not constitute evidence that the government of Nicaragua was trafficking them to El Salvador seven or more years
earlier. "26 In short, Nicaragua v. United States did
lirde to reveal whether Nicaragua supplied arms to
El Salvador, but it did make clear that remedial
options become relevant only after fraud has been
adequately proved. More to rhe point, allegations
offraud raise difficult standard-of-proofquestions
that any normative theory would also have to
address.
Indeed, although I wanted Fraudulent Evidence
Before Public lnumational Tribunals to provide
more answers, my own research on fraudulent
evidence in the narrower realm of international
criminal law provides compelling evidence char
I was unlikely to receive them. My book, Fact-

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986IC) REP. 14 (June27).
20
See also id., para. 134.
21
The Court found that "in the early months of Finding Without FactS: The Uncertain Evidentiary
198 I, an imermirrcnr Aow of arms was routed via the Foundatiom ofInternational Criminal Convictiom,
terriroryofNicaragua ro the armed opposition in El Salvador." !d., para. 160. However it also concluded that considered fact-finding impediments ofall sons in
"the evidence is insufficient to satisfy the Court that, international criminal trials, and it focused consince the early momhs of1981, assistance has continued siderable specific arrention on false testimony. 27
to reach Salvadorian armed opposition from the territory of Nicaragua on any significant scale, or that the
Governmem ofNicaragua was responsible for any Aow
of :arms ar either period." !d.
24
22
SHASTA! ROSENNE, TH£WORLDCOURT: WHAT
judge Schwebel opined that Nicaragua's allegaIT
IS
AND HOW IT WORKS 153 (5th rev. ed. 1995).
tions regarding its alleged supply ofarms to El Salvador
25
Stephen
M. Schwebel, Cekbrating a Fraud on the
were "demonstrably false," and he included a long facCourt,
I
06
AJIL
I02, I03 (20 12).
rual appendix that included evidence co support hiscon26
clusions./d., Diss. Op. Schwebel, J., para. 25.
Paul$. Reiclller, Th~ Nicaragua Case: A Rerporuao
23 Robert F. Turner, Co~rdve Covert Action and the
judgeSchwtbt/, 106 AJIL 316,319 (2012).
27
Law, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 427, 439 (1995) (reviewing
NANCY AMOURY COMBS, FACT-FINDING
W. MICHAEL REISMAN & jAMES E. BAKER, REGU- WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY
u\TING COVERT ACTION: PRACTICES, CONTEXTS, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRJMJNAL
AND POLICLES OF COVERT COERCION ABROAD IN CONVICTIONS (2010), reviewed at 105 A]IL 848
INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN lAW (1992)).
(2011) by Linda A. Malone.
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My research revealed. in particular, that false testimony was pervasive at least at some of che international criminal tribunals,28 and ir identified
several possible causes of the false tescimony. 29
However, whereas documenting me incidence of
false testimony and speculating about irs causes are
relatively straightforward, determining how to
reduce it is nothing of the sort. Certainly, I
advanced various proposals to achieve such a
reduction, from sending judges on on-site visits,30
to dramatically increasing perjury prosecucions,) 1
to employing modc:S ofliabiliry that minimize the
need for eyewitness testimony. 31 !But although [
would like to think that l supported these proposals with convincing argumentation, I nonetheless
recognize that plausible arguments can be marshalled both aga.inst the specific proposals themselves as well as against what might be considered
an undue focus on the prevention of false testimony..B Whether addressing fals~ testimony in
me narrow realm ofinternational criminal law or
18

For instance, I determined thar 92% of cases ar the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda featured at
feast one example of diametrically opposed testimony
berween rwo or more witnesses, such that the testimony
of one of the witnesses was n«essarily inaccurate.
I acknowledged that the high incidenceofblacantlyconrradicrory testimony stood as an imperfect measure of
perjury given that some of the contradictions likely
rdlcetcd the witnesses' mistaken memories or percc:pcions, rather than their willfully false testimony. However, I concluded that because the contradictory testimony was so prevalent, it would be naiVe co dismiss
all-or even a significant proponion-as stemming
from honest miStakes. !d. ac 157-62.
l? I considered both culrural inAuences and financial
incentives as possibly comribucing co che incidence of
false testimony. !d. at 130-48.
30 1<1. at 281-82.
Jt /d. at 282-85.
l2

/d. :u 321-33.

J> During a presentation at which I advocated perjury
prosecutions for those alleged to have provided willfull)·
false testimony, a judge from one of the tribunals
reminded me that every dollar spent co prosecute perjury was a dollar char could nor be spent to prosecute
international crimes. Although I continue to believe
that checosrsofignoringfalse testimony exceed the costs
of combating ir, I must acknowledge that, in a world in
which funds exist to prosecute only a miniscule proportion of those who commit genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity, every diversion of resources is
signifi<::~nt.
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considering all manner of fraudulent evidence in
che broader realm chat Fraudulmt Evidmc~ Bifort'
Public !ntmtational Tribunals canvasses, there are
no easy answers.
In short, ev·en to start to provide answers
requires us to cau:gorize, classify, and consider a
host of relevant factors relating to the kind of evidence involved, the nature ofthe alleged wrongdoing, the role occupied by the alleged wrongdoer,
and the power and influence of the international
court. In this realm, the devil truly is in the details.
Although Frauduknt Evidmt~ Bifore Pub/it
lntmtational Tribunals does not engage in the
categorizing, classifying, and considering required
to develop one or even a series of normative theories to combat fraudulent evidence, it is ro be
applauded for laying some groundwork and starring the dialogue:.
NANCY AMOUR.Y COMBS

\flilliam & Mary lAw School

